https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/japan-south-korea-tensions

2019 saw a rapid deterioration of Japan–South Korea relations on several fronts. In a culmination of the reoccurring spats over nationalist issues such as reparations for Korean comfort women and protests over the Dokdo/Takeshima islands that have characterised the bilateral relationship in recent years, tensions spread from culture to trade, even seeping into the typically untouched realm of South Korea–Japan security relations.

A major trigger was Japan’s unexpected tightening of hi-tech exports to South Korea, which initiated the so-called Japan-South Korea “trade war”. South Korea’s reaction, however, quickly went beyond economic measures. In addition to taking Japan off the preferential partner list, the South Korean government threatened to suspend the intelligence-sharing pact with Japan and has refused to get involved with the Supreme Court’s decision over Japanese wartime labour reparations.

As analysts have pointed out, South Korean reactions have been shaped by concerns over heightened nationalism and public opinion, particularly since other domestic issues and concerns over North Korea have become a growing source of public discontent. The South Korean Foreign Ministry’s justification of approving the Supreme Court’s decision ordering Mitsubishi to compensate South Korean forced labourers is a prime example, seemingly torn between the emotionality of domestic appeal and the objectivity of diplomacy.

Following the latest round of diplomatic talks between South Korea and Japan in Seoul last week, it seems that both nations are keen to move towards a reconciliation in 2020. While the talks are a promising first step to improving relations, the apparent inability of either side to stray from an entrenched position makes reaching middle ground difficult. It is telling, for instance, that following these culture-centric discussions, President Moon’s office has issued a reminder that maintaining the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan remains a “viable option”, but one that is tied to the easing of Japan’s trade restrictions.

Further underlining this complex interplay of culture, security, and trade, Japan launched its second complaint to the World Trade Organisation mere days after the conclusion of the latest round of talks in Seoul.

All in all, a fresh start to Japan–South Korea relations hardly seems likely. Barely two months into 2020, tensions have bubbled over around Japan’s re-opening of a national territory museum in Tokyo. The issue of reparations for Korean victims of Japanese wartime labour has continued to make local headlines, alongside contentions over using the “Rising Sun” flag in the upcoming Olympics and the death of one of the last survivors Japanese sexual slavery during the Second World War.

Anti-Japanese sentiments among the South Korean public have been an important contributor to these tensions, with the boycott of Japanese products being felt across a number of industries – for example, imports of Japanese beer dropped to just US$5000 in September, down from $7 million a year earlier. Similar shocks have affected import car sales and domestic and international air carriers.

As South Korea and Japan have reported more coronavirus cases, however, public attention has shifted towards this new crisis. The issue was brought up in the latest round of bilateral talks in Seoul, but apart from agreeing to continue to closely work together to share related information in “a smooth manner”, few tangible outcomes could be observed at this stage.

Given this lack of substantiative progress, there is some potential for multilateral forums to push for a breakthrough. From a China-Japan-Korea trilateral perspective (which got some attention last year with the summit in Chengdu), there is some promise in President Xi’s expected visit to Seoul in the first half of this year. However, this too remains tempered by residual tensions over THAAD deployment and clouded by uncertainty over the coronavirus.

On the alliance front, tensions with the US over South Korea’s defence contribution and preoccupation with US domestic elections have dampened whatever influence the US may exert in pushing the allies to resolve their differences. Although alliance politics and security concerns over North Korea did contribute to Seoul reaffirming its intelligence-sharing agreement late last year, trade and cultural issues have continued to fester without much progress.

Yet, given the interdependence between the two neighbours, even amidst the current crisis an unexpected reconciliation could be imminent. The outcomes of the recent trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference bear watching, as they shed some light on the prospect of a breakthrough, with the top diplomats of South Korea, the US, and Japan making efforts to address the ongoing tensions, alongside virus outbreak management and security issues in the Middle East.

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Singapore-Thailand Ties 2020:

An Update

KB Teo

SYNOPSIS

Singapore has strong and longstanding ties with Thailand.  Bangkok was one of the first states to recognise Singapore in September 1965, one month after the Republic’s independence.

COMMENTARY

Singapore and Thailand share excellent and multi-faceted bilateral ties. We also cooperate closely at regional and international fora. Strong economic links and robust defence ties are key pillars of the relationship. We also have extensive technical cooperation, including under the Singapore Cooperation Programme (SCP) and the Singapore-Thailand Third Country Training Programme (TCTP), where both countries jointly provide technical assistance to other developing countries in the region, reported the MFA 2020 .

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Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, Minister (Trade and Industry) Chan Chun Sing and Minister (Foreign Affairs) Dr Vivian Balakrishnan attended the 35th ASEAN Summit and related meetings in Bangkok, Thailand, from 2 to 4 November 2019.

In January 2020, Thailand’s navy chief paid his introductory visit to Singapore in his current capacity. The trip underscored the defense ties underway between the two Southeast Asian states amid wider regional and domestic developments, reported the Diplomat.

Thailand and Singapore have a defense relationship that includes not only traditional aspects like exchanges, visits, and exercises, but also components such as an overseas training area for Singapore in Thailand, one of several arrangements that the city-state has with select partners, and minilateral and multilateral interactions including those within the ASEAN framework, the Cobra Gold exercises, and trilateral drills with India.

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The development has continued on over the past year as well amid wider regional and domestic developments. Singapore and Thailand countries held ASEAN chairmanships in 2018 and 2019, respectively, and both are also experiencing domestic flux, with Thailand finally holding an election in 2019 and Singapore preparing to do so in the next year or so amid a leadership transition away from current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong.

The defense aspect of the relationship was in the headlines again with the visit of Thailand’s navy chief to Singapore. Luechai Ruddit, the commander-in-chief of the Royal Thai Navy, paid what was his introductory trip to Singapore in his current capacity. Luechai has held the position since October 2018 and has presided over some key developments within Thailand’s defense approach, including the purchase of assets from China and the restructuring of Thailand’s maritime agencies to address challenges such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.  

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Luechai’s trip lasted from January 20 to January 22 and consisted of a series of interactions. He met with a range of Singaporean officials including Chief of Defense Force Melvyn Ong, Chief of Navy Lew Chuen Hong, and Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen. Singapore’s defense ministry did not disclose any details about the private deliberations, noting that Luechai’s visit “underscores the close and long standing bilateral defense relations between the two countries.”

Close Singapore-Thailand bilateral relations are also reflected in the extensive cooperation among agencies. The Singapore-Thailand Enhanced Partnership (STEP), launched in 1997, provides the framework for long-term strategic partnership in economic cooperation, defence relations, people-to-people cooperation and the Civil Service Exchange Programme (CSEP). Under the CSEP, regular study visits and training programmes are conducted between both countries.

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Singapore and Thailand want to deepen their economic relations and promote greater business-to-business cooperation in the coming years, said Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong on Thursday, following a retreat with his Thai counterpart Prayut Chan-o-cha, reported the BT June 2015.

Speaking during a dinner banquet at the Istana held in Mr Prayut’s honour, Mr Lee hailed the strong economic ties between their two nations, with bilateral trade having grown steadily over the last decade to reach about S$30 billion.

Thailand was Singapore’s ninth-largest trading partner last year. Singapore is now its second-largest foreign investor and was its top investor from South-east Asia in 2013. Singapore’s total investment in Thailand reached S$18.9 billion as at end-2013.

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“I hope we will do more and our companies will find fresh opportunities to invest and to work with one another,” said Mr Lee, as he welcomed Mr Prayut on his two-day introductory visit to Singapore, a year after the 61-year-old former army chief assumed office following a coup.

At a joint press conference, Mr Prayut said that both Singapore and Thailand had the potential to expand bilateral trade and investment cooperation.

He invited businesses in Singapore’s private sector to invest in designated special economic zones along the border areas between Thailand and its neighbouring countries, as well as in various infrastructure projects on transport and logistics in Thailand.

Among the highlights of the first day of his visit was the signing of four bilateral deals, one of which was a revised agreement containing improved terms for an avoidance of double taxation on income earned in one country by a resident of the other.

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This double-taxation agreement, inked by Law and Foreign Minister K Shanmugam and Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Tanasak Patimapragorn, replaced the one signed in 1975.

The two governments also signed an agreement on cruise tourism, with the aim of having more sailings to tap on the growing demand for cruises in the region.

The Singapore Manufacturing Federation and the Federation of Thai Industries, meanwhile, agreed to work together to strengthen business relations and promote economic cooperation between their organisations.

Mr Lee noted that the good ties were not just between the two governments, but their peoples as well. Last year, some 800,000 Singaporeans visited Thailand, and more than 500,000 Thais came to Singapore. Thailand is the 10th largest source market for visitor arrivals into Singapore.

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Touching on the political situation in his country, Mr Prayut thanked Mr Lee and the Singapore government for their understanding and confidence in the political and economic stability of Thailand.

During the retreat for the leaders of both countries, Mr Prayut took the chance to update Mr Lee on the progress of Thailand’s political reform process as the country looks to hold a general election in 2016.

“The return of Thailand to order and stability will help contribute to the overall stability and security of Asean, as well as to bilateral relations between Thailand and Singapore,” said the Thai leader.

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Mr Lee remarked that Singapore, as a “close friend” of Thailand’s, was happy to see that the Kingdom was stable and making progress.  The Thai leader is expected to make another visit here in two months, for Singapore’s Golden Jubilee celebrations on Aug 9.

Thailand was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic links with Singapore back in September 1965, just a month after the Republic’s independence.

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KB Teo is a former diplomat with the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  He attended the UN General Assembly as part of the MFA delegation.

Zhang Yining

Lin Chiling