China and Taiwan:

Consistency and Patience

KB Teo

SYNOPSIS

Since 1949, Beijing has a consistent Taiwan policy.  China sees Taiwan as a renegade province that must return to the motherland, by force if necessary.  Seventy years have passed. China’s patience, not surprisingly, has limits.

COMMENTARY

In the Chinese Civil War (1930-1949),  General Chiang Kai Shek’s Kuomintang (KMT) lost.  He fled to Taiwan, with US help. The KMT continues to maintain the fiction of Republic of China (ROC).

Mao Zedong established the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 1949. Initially, most states recognise the ROC as the sole, legal, government of China.  The situation has changed. Today, most states recognise the PRC. Only a few states, mainly in South America/Carribean, still recognise Taiwan as the legal government of China.

Rise of independence-minded 

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)

The DPP was founded in 1986.  It is a Taiwanese nationalist and center-left political party.  In the year 2000, it dropped its independence platform on concerns about attacks from Beijing. Controlling both the Taiwan Presidency and the unicameral Legislative Yuan, it is the majority ruling party and the dominant party in the Pan-Green Coalition.  The DPP is one of two major parties in Taiwan, along with the historically dominant Kuomintang (KMT). It has traditionally been associated with strong advocacy of human rights, anti-communism and a distinct Taiwanese identity. 

The incumbent President and former leader of the DPP, Tsai Ing-wen, is the second member of the DPP to hold the office.  The DPP is a long-term member of Liberal International and a founding member of the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats. It represented Taiwan in the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation. The DPP and its affiliated parties are widely classified as socially liberal because of their strong support for human rights, including support for gender equality, but they also advocate economic liberalism and a nationalistic identity. In addition, the DPP is more willing to increase military expenditures, with a strong pro-Western foreign policy.

The DPP won the presidency with the election of Chen Shui-bian in March 2000 with a plurality, due to Pan-Blue voters splitting their vote between the Kuomintang and independent candidate James Soong, ending more than half a century of KMT rule in the  Republic of China. Chen softened the party’s stance on independence to appeal to moderate voters, appease the United States and placate China. He also promised not to change the ROC state symbols or declare formal independence as long as the People’s Republic of China did not attack Taiwan.

The DPP became the largest party having reached a plurality in the Legislative Yuan for the first time in 2002 following the 2001 legislative election. However, a majority coalition between the KMT, People First Party, and New Party prevented it from taking control of the chamber.

In 2004, President Chen Shui-bian was re-elected by a narrow margin. He and Vice President Annette Lu had been involved in an assassination attempt only hours before the election. The KMT candidate, Lien Chan, demanded a recount the following morning. A judicial recount under the jurisdiction of a special panel of the 

High Court began on 10 May 2004 and ended on 18 May 2004.  In July 2019, a new political Party, Formosa Alliance, was formed.  It seeks Taiwan independence. It is seeking to win no fewer than 10 Legislative seats in the January 2020 elections.

China thundered in vain that America should cancel Tsai’s visit, during which she met members of Congress .   In a speech at Columbia University, Tsai defended liberal, democratic values. “Taiwan is not, and will not be, intimidated,” she said at a reception in New York with representatives of Taiwan’s 17 remaining diplomatic allies in the Caribbean.

President Trump has signed off on a more tangible measure of assistance for Taiwan: approval for a long-planned sale of arms, worth $2.2bn, that includes tanks and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. The sale of more than 60 f-16 fighter jets looks likely soon, too.

China claims to be outraged by the recent sales and has threatened to impose sanctions on the American companies involved. Yet they are all of a piece with long-standing bipartisan support for Taiwan’s defence. On 24 July 2019,  a US warship made what America called a routine transit of the Taiwan Strait. In truth, much American-supplied equipment is old and vulnerable to China’s new precision-guided weapons. But the sales remain a powerful signal of America’s backing.

Han, whose family hails from the mainland, is a voluble proponent of appeasing China. He says binding Taiwan more closely to China’s vast markets will bring prosperity. But it may also imperil Taiwan’s autonomy.  In contrast to the mousy Ms Tsai, Han is a natural orator with a common touch. He drives crowds of older, working-class and rural followers wild. With 45% support in the primary, he blew past the runner-up, Terry Gou, a billionaire maker of iPhones, with 28%.

Han calls Taiwanese independence “more scary” than syphilis. He refers to Taiwan as a region (that is, of China).  Yet the Hong Kong protests have forced Han to back away from China. The Communist Party wants its formula of supposed autonomy for Hong Kong—“one country, two systems”—to apply one day to Taiwan. “Over my dead body”, Mr Han had to declare.

While Ms Tsai may be seen as the better defender of Taiwanese sovereignty, her chances of re-election may be further boosted if Ko Wen-je, the pro-China mayor of Taipei, runs as an independent presidential candidate.  Gou has not ruled out doing the same. This would split the opposition vote. In a poll published on 22 June 2019, TVBS, a KMT-leaning network, found Tsai ahead with the support of 37%, compared with 29% for Mr Han and 20% for Mr Ko. For now Ms Tsai’s sun is shining.

President Xi Jinping has warned that Beijing has limits regarding Taiwan’s “return to the motherland”.  Taiwanese leaders and politicians have tended to ignore the warning. If Beijing invades someday, Washington is unlikely to intervene for two reasons.  One, militarily, China is fast closing the gap. Two, the US is also unlikely to relish the destruction of New York and Washington merely to save Taipei.

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KB Teo is a former diplomat with the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He attended the UN General Assembly as part of the MFA delegation.